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Preface
Economics lost an important part of its foundations, and some would say of its raison d'être, when the theory of economic policy devised by Jan Tinbergen, Henry Theil, Ragnar Frisch and others was destroyed under the logical stringency of the Lucas critique. The idea of the government as influencing or even controlling a private sector with conflicting targets, but not fully informed and possibly inactive, was certainly short-sighted and correctly dismissed after Lucas' criticisms. However, the Lucas critique contributed to a widespread but often incorrect belief of policy irrelevance, time inconsistency in policy actions and the need to substitute government by markets.
This book recognizes Lucas' point of view and the idea that different agents -in particular, the government and private agents -can have fully or partially divergent goals and actively intervene in order to try to pursue them. But it distinguishes that idea from its implications, derived in specific context, by attempting to build, on the ashes of the Tinbergen-Theil contributions, a general approach to the theory of economic policy consistent with the Lucas critique and rational expectations. In our view, the proper general context where such active conflicts can be analyzed is to be seen in policy games. Then, by using a revised version of the tools introduced by Tinbergen, Theil and others in this context, we derive a new and more relevant theory of economic policy.
The main propositions of this new theory describe such properties of the models usually used for policymaking as neutrality or equilibrium existence, uniqueness, and multiplicity. These properties are also the key to understanding the impact of many concepts -such as rational expectations, time inconsistency, communication effectiveness, and policy announcements -currently used in macroeconomic theory and many other applications. These concepts are therefore useful both for model building and for devising proper institutions, and we hope that they will re-establish the theory of economic policy as Preface xiii Catholique de Louvain for hospitality during his work on the very last part of the book.
We should also express our thanks to many colleagues for their comments and feedback, after many discussions on the issues investigated in the book during the last ten years, when we were developing the first concepts of our approach to the theory of economic policy. These were invaluable in giving us a better understanding of the subject matter. We are particularly grateful to Bas van Aarle, Guido Candela, Maria Chiarolla, Jacob Engwerda, Peter Flaschel, Douglas Hibbs, George Kouretas, Reinhard Neck, Stefano Papa, Wilfried Pauwels, Joseph Plasmans, Emanuela Randon, Patrizio Tirelli. We are also grateful to the anonymous referees of Cambridge University Press for their appreciation of our manuscript and their valuable remarks.
All the authors especially thank Paolo G. Piacquadio, a former student of the Sapienza Doctoral School, for his cooperation in a number of papers and his revision of the whole manuscript. His coauthorship in Chapters 8 and 9 is formally recognized, but his contribution of ideas as well as formal solutions to a number of issues goes well beyond that.
Veronica Fedeli has provided invaluable help in editing the many papers on which this book is based, as well as editing the many versions of the manuscript. Chris Harrison, of Cambridge University Press, provided us with valuable suggestions and has followed the various steps of the publication with care and efficiency. Thanks also to Elizabeth Spicer for her efficiency and patience.
Finally, we would like to thank our respective families without whom, it might be thought, the book would have been completed in half the time. In fact, the blame for that is entirely ours (although not perhaps in equal measure); as is the responsibility for any errors, omissions or views that the reader might not agree with. 
